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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the 
American Institute of Accountants at the examination of May, 1934, have 
been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. The an­
swers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way 
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor, . 
The Journal of Accountancy.
Examination in Commercial Law
May 18, 1934, 9 A. M. to 12:30 P. M.
Reasons must be stated for each answer. Whenever practicable, give the answer 
first and then state reasons. Answers will be graded according to the applicant's 
evident knowledge of the legal principles involved in the question, rather than on his 
conclusions.
Group I
Answer all questions in this group.
No. 1 (10 points):
Williams, a patent lawyer, was rendering legal services to Young on applica­
tions for patents which Young had made. Prior to the issue of the patents, 
Young made a contract with Bostwick whereby Bostwick agreed to conduct and 
pay for further prosecution of the applications. In this contract no mention 
was made of Williams or of any other patent lawyer. Williams knew that the 
contract was made and in reliance upon it he thereafter rendered legal services 
in the further prosecution of the applications but without the knowledge or 
consent of Bostwick or Young. Williams sued Bostwick on the theory that 
Williams was a third party beneficiary under the contract. For whom should 
judgment be rendered?
Answer:
Judgment should be rendered for Bostwick. The parties intended that the 
contract should protect Young. There is nothing in it which would show an 
intention to confer a benefit on a third party beneficiary. The fact that the 
carrying out of the contract required engaging a patent attorney is not deter­
mining because none of the provisions of this contract was intended to benefit 
Williams. To allow a party to recover on a contract to which he is not a party, 
it is necessary that the contract shall not merely operate for his benefit, but 
that it shall have been intended for his benefit.
No. 2 (10 points):
A savings bank received a letter purporting to be signed by one of its deposi­
tors and enclosing that depositor’s pass-book. The letter contained a request 
that a cheque for part of the balance of the account be mailed to him at an 
address in another state. The bank as requested mailed the cheque and the 
pass-book, enclosing them with a letter addressed to the depositor. The 
cheque was presented to the drawee national bank by the writer of the first 
letter, and he identified himself by showing the depositor’s pass-book and the 
letter written by the savings bank. The national bank paid the cheque. Sub­
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sequently the savings bank learned that its depositor’s pass-book had been 
stolen and that the letter purporting to be from him was a forgery. Can the 
savings bank recover the amount of the cheque from the national bank?
Answer:
The savings bank can recover the amount of the cheque from the national 
bank, the drawee. Where the payee’s endorsement upon a cheque is forged 
and the drawee bank pays the cheque, the general rule is that the loss falls upon 
the drawee bank. If the drawer has been negligent so that the drawee is im­
posed upon, then the drawer must bear the loss. However, even if it is as­
sumed that the drawer was negligent, such negligence is immaterial where, as 
here, the drawee pays the cheque without sufficient identification of the payee 
and upon a forged endorsement of the payee’s signature.
No. 3 (10 points) :
Each of the following paragraphs purports to summarize the law on the point 
involved. State as to each of them whether or not it is correct; if any one is in­
correct restate it; and in each instance give the legal reasons on which the rule is 
based:
(a) A stockholder has a preemptive right to participate ratably with other 
stockholders in subscribing for new shares when the corporation's capital stock 
is increased and new stock is issued.
(b) A stockholder has the same right with respect to authorized but unissued 
stock.
(c) A stockholder has the same right with respect to treasury stock acquired 
by the corporation with the intention of reissuing it.
(d) A stockholder has the same right with respect to treasury stock, acquired 
by the corporation with the intention of retiring it, which later is offered to 
investors.
Answer:
(a) This statement is correct in most jurisdictions. The principle of law is 
that taking away the preemptive right would lessen the stockholder’s propor­
tionate voice in the control of the corporation and his proportionate share in the 
surplus of the corporation without his consent.
(b) This statement is incorrect in most jurisdictions because the stockholder 
takes his stock with knowledge that there is other stock unissued.
(c) This statement is incorrect. The stockholder’s proportionate share is 
not affected by such a transaction.
(d) This statement is correct, although the law is not clear-cut on this sub­
ject. It is stated that such stock may cease to be true treasury stock within 
the rule permitting reissue without affording stockholders a right to participate 
ratably. The same theory of law is responsible for this statement, i. e., a sup­
posedly permanent proportionate voting status is disadvantageously affected. 
It would seem to be a factual question as to whether the stock is or is not 
treasury stock at time of sale.
No. 4 (10 points):
Plaintiff entrusted securities to defendant, a stockbroker, for safe-keeping. 
Plaintiff was not dealing on margin and he was not indebted to defendant in any 
amount, and defendant charged plaintiff a reasonable fee for his custodianship. 
Plaintiff gave defendant no authority to hypothecate these securities, but 
defendant nevertheless pledged them as security for a loan. Defendant 
became bankrupt and the pledgee of the securities legally and in due form sold 
them. Plaintiff now sues defendant for the value of the securities and de­
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fendant pleads his discharge in bankruptcy as a defense. Discuss the validity 
of this defense on each of the following assumptions:
(a) Defendant hypothecated the securities wilfully and maliciously;
(b) Defendant hypothecated them through an innocent but mistaken belief 
that the securities belonged to defendant.
Answer:
(a) If defendant hypothecated the securities wilfully and maliciously, a dis­
charge in bankruptcy would not bar the action.
(b) If defendant hypothecated the securities innocently under mistaken 
belief of ownership, a discharge in bankruptcy would be a valid defense. The 
act must be wilful or malicious to prevent the bankrupt broker from setting up 
his discharge in bar in a conversion action.
No. 5 (10 points):
Stern, by a written instrument, legally guaranteed the payment by Colt of all 
charges for goods purchased from the Emporia Company. Colt failed to pay 
certain proper charges and the Emporia Company sued Colt. During the trial, 
the case was settled and discontinued upon Colt’s written agreement to pay a 
stated amount in specific instalments, with the proviso that the entire balance 
of the stated amount would become due upon default in the payment of any 
instalment. Thereafter Colt defaulted in his second instalment. Is Stern 
liable on his guarantee?
Answer:
Stern is not liable on his guarantee. The new agreement gave Colt additional 
time to pay and any such change in an obligation or duty of principal without 
guarantor’s consent discharges guarantor of obligation.
Group II
Answer any five questions in this group. No credit will be given for additional 
answers, and if any are submitted only the first five will be considered.
No. 6 (10 points):
Jordan was a salesman on commission with a drawing account. In March, 
1932, he was discharged and a dispute arose between him and his employer as to 
the amount due him. On April 7, 1932, the employer gave Jordan a cheque for 
$390, marked “Final” on its face and endorsed “Payment in full for commis­
sions earned or to be earned and/or all claims to date.” Jordan added to this 
“Also subject to Mr. Jordan’s letter of 4/7/32,” endorsed the cheque and 
cashed it. In his letter of April 7, 1932, Jordan wrote his employer that he was 
“compelled to receive this cheque under protest subject to adjustment of my 
account.” Did Jordan’s acceptance of this cheque constitute an accord and 
satisfaction?
Answer:
Jordan’s acceptance of this cheque amounted to an accord and satisfaction. 
He could not use the cheque and then seek to disregard the condition on which 
it was tendered. He accepted the cheque on the express condition that it was 
in satisfaction of a bona-fide controversy then existing between the parties.
No. 7 (10 points):
The president of a corporation had power under the by-laws to appoint, to 
remove and to fix the compensation of employees. Without express authoriza­
tion from or ratification by the board of directors he made a contract with Jones 
whereby the corporation was to employ Jones for life. Was this contract bind­
ing upon the corporation?
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A nswer:
This contract was not binding on the corporation. If authorized by the 
corporation it would be sustained, but the president of a corporation as such has 
no authority to make a contract with anyone for a lifetime employment even 
under the general power stated. The power to make such an unusual contract 
can not be implied and since it can not be found to be given expressly the con­
tract was beyond the president’s power and is therefore not binding on the 
corporation.
No. 8 (10 points):
The X Dress Corporation made a promissory note payable to the order of 
“ourselves.” Brown was president of that corporation and as such he signed 
the note. The note was endorsed before maturity by the maker corporation 
and by Brown individually. Prior to the due date of the note, the X Dress 
Corporation made an assignment of its assets for the benefit of creditors and 
said assignment was executed by Brown as president. The note was not paid 
at maturity and the maker corporation and Brown individually were sued. 
Notice of dishonor of the note had not been given to Brown. Can Brown be 
held as endorser?
Answer:
Brown can not be held as an endorser. To hold an endorser liable upon a 
promissory note, notice of the failure of the maker to pay the note must be given 
the endorser. The notice must be to the effect that the endorser is looked to 
personally for payment. Even if Brown, in his capacity as president of the 
corporation which made the note, knew that it would not be or had not been 
paid, such knowledge does not dispense with the necessity of giving notice of 
nonpayment to him personally as endorser. Nor does the financial condition 
of the corporation maker, resulting in an assignment for the benefit of creditors 
which was executed by Brown as president, dispense with the requirement that 
he be given notice of nonpayment.
No. 9 (10 points):
The securities act of 1933 provides that in certain cases of untrue statements 
or omissions of statements which should have been made, certain persons “may, 
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue” an ac­
countant who has prepared or certified any part of the registration statement.
(a) Explain what is meant by equity and how it differs from law.
(b) What is the most common remedy obtainable only in equity?
A nswer:
(a) The subject of equity jurisprudence is one of great variety and extent. 
Probably the most striking and distinctive feature of courts of equity is that 
they can adapt their decrees to all varieties of circumstances which may arise 
and so adjust them to all the peculiar rights, mutual and adverse, of all the 
parties in interest, whereas in courts of law a general and unqualified judgment 
only may be given, which must be for the plaintiff or for the defendant without 
any adaptation of it to particular circumstances.
(b) The most common remedy obtainable only in equity is injunction.




No. 10 (10 points):
Define briefly the following terms (do not discuss or give examples):
(d) principal of trust
(e) life tenant
(f) remainderman
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Answer:
(a) Last will and testament—A disposition of real and personal property 
belonging to the maker to take effect after his death.
(b) Legacy—A bequest of personal property made by a last will and testa­
ment.
(c) Testamentary trustee—A person in whom some estate, interest or power 
in or affecting property is vested for the benefit of another by effect of appoint­
ment in a last will and testament.
(d) Principal of trust—I do not know what this means unless principal as 
distinguished from income.
(e) Life tenant—A person who holds an estate for the duration of his life. 
Sometimes definition includes one who holds for the life of some other person.
(f) Remainderman—A person who is entitled to the remainder of an estate 
after a particular estate taken out of it has come to an end.
No. 11 (10 points):
(a) Define and differentiate condition precedent and condition subsequent.
(b) Define and differentiate representation and warranty.
Answer:
(a) A condition precedent is a fact (other than mere lapse of time) which, 
unless excused must exist or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a 
promise arises. A condition subsequent is a fact which unless made inoperative 
will extinguish a duty to make compensation for breach of contract after the 
breach has occurred. The former must exist or occur before any rights arise 
under the contract; the latter operates to extinguish those rights that have 
arisen under the contract.
(b) A representation is a statement proffered as a basis for a contract, but 
instead of being a part of the contract it is collateral to it. A warranty is a 
statement upon the literal truth of which the enforceability of the contract 
depends. A representation precedes and is not part of the contract and need 
be only materially true, while a warranty is part of the contract and must be 
strictly fulfilled or the contract is unenforceable. A warranty must be strictly 
true; a representation need only be substantially true.
No. 12 (10 points):
Edward Brown was secretary of Charles Brown, Inc., and owned one quarter 
of its capital stock, and his father owned three quarters of it. This corpora­
tion was engaged in the grain business in the middle west. In 1922, the corpo­
ration was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, Edward Brown was adjudged a 
voluntary bankrupt, and each was discharged from existing debts. Thereafter 
Edward Brown made a contract with another corporation to buy grain for it on 
a commission basis. In order to reestablish his standing and credit and revive 
business relationships with former customers of Charles Brown, Inc., he per­
sonally paid most of the business debts of Charles Brown, Inc., which had been 
discharged in bankruptcy. Can Edward Brown deduct these payments from 
his commission income on his federal income-tax returns for the years in which 
he made the payments?
Answer:
Edward Brown can not deduct these payments on his income-tax returns. 
The only theory on which the deduction can be allowed is that these payments 
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were ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year 
in carrying on a trade or business. Although it be assumed that the payment 
is “necessary” it can not be said that the payments were “ordinary.” These 
payments were made to reestablish a good financial reputation and are not 
ordinary expenditures; on the contrary, they are more like capital expenditures.
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